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INTRODUCTION TO STOCI IASTIC CONTROL APPLICATIONS
In' GREGORY C.Ciiow*
We introduce the se'k'etd papers fromthe Third NBER Stochastic Control Conference. ithicli are published
in she spring, 1975 issue of the Annals of Economic and Social Measurement The confrre'nce ivas held
in Washington, D.C., Iron, May 29 to May 31. 1974, and was cosponsored by the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System. Over seventy persons attended the conference. The papers deal itith applica-
tions of stochastic control to macroeconomics and microecono,nics. and itiih, developments in control
theory and methods.
Following the conferences at Princeton University in 1972 and at the Unisiiy
QLChica.go in 1973 the Third NBER Stochastic Control Conference was held
at the National Academy of Sciences. Washington, D.C., on May 29-31, 1974,
with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Systemas a cosponsor.
Twenty-eight papers were presented. The conference program is included in the
Appendix to this introduction. About 70 persons participated. In addition,
numerous members on the staff of the Federal Reserve Board attended the sessions.
Most of the papers were submitted in response to an announcement and call
for papers which I had circulated early in January, 1974. Michael Athans was
responsible for a session of survey papers on dynamic game and team problems.
David Kendrick helped organize a session on estimation and control. James
Pierce coordinated several reports from the FRB staff on the nature of the SMP
(SSRC-M IT-Penn) econometric model and its use for optimal control calculations
at the Federal Reserve Board. Among the persons who contributed significantly
to running this cGnference and the handling of its local arrangements, Steven M.
Roberts and Evelyn Kender of FRB and Anna Trembley of NBER deserve our
sincere thanks.
Less than half of the papers presented before the conference are included in
this Special Issue of the Annals. Some papers have been submitted to other journals,
and others are in the nature of progress reports or expositions already contained
in other publications. The included papers do provide a picture of the current
research activities in the field of stochastic control in economics. 1 will try to
describe them briefly by way of an introduction. Readers interested in background
material on the subject may refer to the introductory essays in the October. 1972,
and January, 1974 issues of the Annals which reported on the first and second
NBER stochastic control conferences, or to G. C. Chow, Analvsis andControl of
Dynamic Economic Systems,John Wiley and Sons. Inc., 1975.
The papers in this volume can be divided into three groups. The first is
concerned with macroeconomic applications of stochastic control. The second
with microeconomic applications and the third with developments in control
*would like to acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation Grant
GS43747X and to thank Kent D. Wall for commenting on the first draft.
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theory and methods, In themacroeconomics group, the paper by Kenneth (larhade
attempts to measure the extent to whichdiscretionary policies could help stabilize
the American economy in thel960's. Discretionary policies are feedback policies.
They assign values to the policyor control variables depending on the performance
of the controlled systemover the planning period so that the Instrumentsare, in
part, a function of the random disturbancesaffecting the system. Thus discretionary
policies react to discrepancies betweenthe actual and the desired behaviorof the system. In contrast, nondiscretionarypolicies assign values to theinstruments
over the future irrespective of whatoccurs during the planning period. Maintaining
constant rates of change for the policyvariables exemplifies a nondiscretionary
policy. Garbade employsa fairly sophisticated nondiscretionary policy,namely, the solution to thenonstochastic control problem formulatedby ignoring the
random disturbances in theeconometric model. This permits him tomeasure the gain from feedback control,The model employed isa nonlinear quarterly econo-
metric model consisting ofsome 43 structural equations. Besides therates of unemployment and inflation,per capita consumption expenditures,per capita residential housing,period-to-period changes ingovernment purchases of goods and services, ingovernment employment, and in the Treasurybill rate, a federal personal tax scaling factor, FederalHome Loan advances, andgovernment compensation to its employeesenter the welfare function, the last sixvariables being control variables.For the eleven quarters beginningfrom the second
quarter of 1960, Garbade has foundthat a discretionary policywould yield an expected loss (in weightedsum of squares of deviations of theselected variables from targets) equalto approximately half of the lossfrom applying a nondiscre- tionary policy. Besides itssubstantive conclusions, Garbade'spaper has contri- buted to the methods ofobtaining approximatelyoptimal control solutions for nonlinear stuctural equationswith random disturbances,assuming no uncertainty in the estimatedparameters.
The paper by Andrew B.Abel attempts tomeasure the relative effectiveness of monetary and fiscalpolicies by comparing theoptimal expected welfare loss obtained when bothsets of instruments are appliedoptimally and when onlyone set can be freely used, withthe other subject toa constant rate of change. The model used is a very simpleone Consisting of two equationsexplaining aggregate consumption and investmentexpenditures by their laggedvalues and bygovern- ment expenditures andmoney supply. The last twoare Control variablesrepre- senting fiscal andmonetary policies respectively.It was found thatexpected welfare loss increasessubstantially if either instrumentis not permittedto perform freely, thus confirmingthe importance ofboth instruments, butthat the expected loss increases slightlymore when governmentexpenditures are restrainedto play a passive role. Abel'sstudy employs threedifferent methods ofcontrol for linear stochasticsystems, one assuming themodel parametersto be known for certain, a second allowingfor uncertainty inthe parameters butignoring the possibility of future learningabout them, and thethird incorporatingan element of learning in thedetermination of thecontrol policy for thefirst period. Although the above majorconclusion is supportedby calculationsobtained by all three methods, his study illustratesthe differenceswhich uncertainty inthe parameters
208can make in terms of the optimal lèedhack contrnl equations and the associated
expected welfare losses.
The paper by S. K. Gupta, Lawrence Meyer. Frederick Rains and Ti. Tarn
attempts to study the elTect of price control on economic stabilization in the context
of three versions of a macroeconomic model. The first version is based on the
Phillips-Lipsey formulation of the traditional Phillips curve which ignores price
expectations. The second is attributed to the Friedman Phelps-Mortensen formu-
lation which implies the absence of long-run trade-off between inflation and
unemployment. The third permits both price expectations and long-run trade-off.
The model consists basically of five equations. An aggregate demand equation
explains the total of the demand for consumption, investment and government
spending. An aggregate output adjustment equation determines the change in
output by the difference between aggregate demand and actual output of the
preceding period, subject to total output not exceeding potential output. Third,
the change in the price level depends on excess demand, expected price change
(absent in the first version), and the existence of price control. Four, the expected
price change is determined by a weighted sum of lagged expected price change
and actual price change and by price control. Fifth, potential output is a function
of the difference between actual and expected price change which affects labor
supply (absent in the first version) and of the potential decline in supply due to
the imposition of price control. The model is deterministic. Welfare loss is quadratic
in the difference between actual and maximum output, the inflation rate, the
change in government spending and the costs associated with price controls. it
was found, for the particular numerical values assigned to the parameters, that
the use of price control can reduce welfare loss substantially in the second version
of the model but not in the first version.
in the borderline between micro- and macroeconomic applications, the
paper by Gordon Rausser and Richard Howitt applies the framework of stochastic
control to the regulation of wastes produced by a group of firms. Both firm behavior
and the behavior of the government control agency have to be modeled. The three
(vector) control variables are the tax rates on waste emissions, the frequencies of
measurement of waste concentrations in selected locations, and the legal enforce-
ment efforts. Firms take the costs of producing wastes into account in the maximiza-
tion of profits, and thus the government tax rates affect the production of wastes
and regular outputs. A dynamic system is derived with these two types of produc-
tion and the waste concentrations in selected locations as the state variables and
government tax rates as control variables. Besides, a set of observation equations
determine the legally settled amounts ol' wastes produced by the firms and the
measured (rather than the "true') amounts of waste concentrations, with fre-
quencies of measurement and legal enforcement costs as control variables. A
quadratic loss function is assumed. The selection of optimal waste taxes is found
to be separable from the determination of measurement frequencies and legal
efforts. The former is a linear-quadratic stochastic conirol problem to be solved
by applying linear feedback control equations to the estimated states obtained by
a Kalman filter. The latter is reduced to a nonlinear but deterministic control
problem to be solved for all periods in the finite planning horizon by gradient or
209I
other numerical methods. Extensions to the model and directions for empirical
implementation are suggested.
In the paper by Charles Tapiero, a random walk model is formulated to
explain the effectofadvertising on sales. A differential equation specifics the
probability of selling x units at r as a function of the rate at which the customers
forget and the rate of advertising. A diffusion approximation to this random walk
model leads to a stochastic differential equation in sales. The mean of sales turns
out to satisfy the same differential equation as the advertising model ol Nerlove
Arrow, orofVidaleWolfe, depending on whether the effect of advertising is
independentofthe gap between a preassigned saturation level and existing sales.
Thus ajustificationfs provided for each of these models of advertising. Likelihood
ratio tests are provided for testing various hypotheses concerning these models,
and an application to testing the existence ofeconomy of scale in advertising is
given. Although the paper does not deal with the selection ofan optimal advertising
strategy, the stage is set, by providing the mathematical and statistical tools for
the formulation and testing of stochastic models of advertising,for the application
of optimal control techniques to the determination ofadvertising policies.
The paper by Chee-Yee Chong and David Cheng explores the behavioral
implications of using adaptive control rules in thecontext of a monopolist facing
a time-invariant linear demand function with unknown parameters. Maximizing
expected profit over a finite number of periods, the monopolist behavesasifhe
were to solve an adaptive control problem of choosing optimal prices by the
method of dynamic programming. Analytical solutioncannot be obtained if both
the slope and the intercept of the demand functionare unknown. Several approxi
mate solutions are applied, and results of simulation experimentsare reported.
It is found that pricing behavior when uncertaintyabout parameter values is
accounted for can be quite different from the certainty-equivalentsolution.
The problem posed by Edward Stohr in hispaper, "A Model of a Project
Activity," is to minimize expected totalcost of completing a preassigned amount
of work, measured by a scalar, givena production function (with only one input)
and a cost function both of whichare subject to additive random disturbances.
There is no limit on the time requiredto complete the project. The problem is
treated in both continuous and discrete time. Forthe continuous time problem,
it is shown that a policy of applyinga constant rate of input per period is optimal.
For the discrete time problem,a constant-input policy based on certainty equiva-
knee, an optimal constant-input policy,and the optimal policyare compared.
Bounds are obtained for the differencesbetween the first two policies thesecond
policy is found to be approximately optimal.Applications to some special produc-
tion and cost functionsare given. The implications for the design ofcontrol
systems for activities of random durationare indicated.
Among the papers on control theory andmethods, the one by J. B. Cruz is
a survey of Nash and Stackelberg equilibriumstrategies in dynamicgames. In
the classical control problem, thereis one control agent whoseactions alone,
together with random disturbances fromnature, determine the stateofthe system.
In a dynamic game, the actions ofseveral players affect thestateofthe system
through a differential or differenceequation, and each tries to maximizehis own objective functionofthe state. While each player isassumed to know the differential
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4.equation for the state, his own strategy. and his own loss function, hemay or ma
1101 know the state of the system at present and in the past. Different Nash equili-
brium strategcs ate delined and studied accordingto the ifflorination available
to eachplayer. Oligopoly situations with intermediate-run horizonsand an
armament race between two nations are possible applications of Nash equilibrium
strategies. On the other hand, if when therearc only two players and one (the
follower) can be assumed to take the strategy of the other (theleader) as given.
the Stackelberg equilibrium strategies would he relevant. Onepossible application
is to an optimal macroeconomic stabilization problem withthe government
viewed as the leader and the competitive private sectoras the follower, but the
government has to take the latter's reaction into consideration in the formation
of its stabilization policies.
in a decentralized control problem, the state of the system is affectedby the
actions of several agents, as in a dynamic game. There is, however,one objective
function which measures the overall performance of the entiresystem. A coordin-
ator is assumed to exist who wishes to achieve the best overall performance of
the system by allowing the local agents to operate accordingto certain rules.
The paper by Michael Athans does not containa well specified mathematical
formulation of the decentralized control problem. Rather itreports on several
attempts to search lor a mathematical formulation whichmay justify the use of
decentralized control. The approach taken is to modify the assumptionsof the
classical stochastic control problem witha single control agent, especially in
regard to the information available to him. For example, the centralagent or
coordinator is allowed to know only the control actions taken by the localagents,
but not their measurements of the state, orto receive local subsystemmeasurements
or decisions only periodically. The information available to the coordinator and
to the local agents will affect crucially the nature of the problem and thus the
solution for decentralized control.
The importance of the information structure in multi-person optimization
problems, whether the individuals are assumed to achieve their individualgoals
in a gaming situation or to assist in achievinga set of overall objectives for the
system, is the subject of a survey lecture given by Y. C. Ho. Nopaper by Ho is
included in this volume, but references to his published works include:
I. Y. C. Ho and K. C. Chu. "Information Structure in Dynamic Multi-Person
Control Problems," A utonwtica. July 1974.
Yu-Chi Ho and Fang-Kuo Sun. "Value of Information in Two-Person
Zero Sum Problems." Jouriuil of Optimi:at ion Theory and Applications.
to appear.
Tamer Basar and Yu-Chi Ho, informational Properties of the Nash
Solutions to Two Stochastic Nonzero-Sum Games," Journal of Economic
Theory. April 1974.
Y. C. Ho. I. Blau, and T. l3asar. ''A Tale of I-our Information Structures,"
Proceedings of IRIA Symposium on Control Theory. June 1974; Springer-
Verlag Notes on Maiheinatita! Systeiiis and Economics, October 1974.
The papers by Athans and Ho emphasize the dynamicaspects of the related prob-
lems treated by economists including:
211Jacob Marschak and Roy Radner,Eeononic Theory (flearns,Yale
UniversityPress. 1972.
Theodore Grove and Roy Radner, "The Allocation of Resources ina
Team,"Journal 01 Economic Theor',June 1972.
7 Theodore Groves, "Incentives in Teams,"Econometrica, July 1973.
Dynamic game and team problems are areas of mutual intereststo economists
and control scientists. Continuing exchangesare to be expected.
In summary, after editing thisSpecial Issue. Ihave found that as the methods
of optimal control are constantly improvedupon to deal with more difficult
situations such as nonlinear econometricsystems, systems with unknown param-
eters, and systems with more than one controlagent, the)' are being applied to
economic problems of greater complexity. Morecomplicated models are being
used than before, as exemplified by the worksof Garbade and of Rausser and
Howitt. The amount and the variety of researchas illustrated in this volume and
in the Appendix confirms the fact that thesubject is in an established and ongoing
stage. At the time of writing this introduction in February1975, a Fourth NBER
Stochastic Control Conference is being plannedby David Kendrick and Edison
Tse to take place in Cambridge, Mass., May21-23, 1975. Hopefully, the papers






NBER Conference on the Computer inEconomic and Social Research
and
Board of Governors of the Federal ReserveSystem
Washington, D.C., May 29-31, 1974
Wednesday, May 29
Morning Arrival of Participants
Registration, National Academyof Sciences,
2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W.
2.00-5.00 Control in Macroeconomjcsj
Chrman; Gregory C. Chow(Princeton)
Michael Athans (MIT) "TheInterplay Between ModelingAccuracy and the Use of Optimal Feedb.ckControl for Stochastic LinearEconometric Models"
Kenneth D. Garbade (NYU)"Discretion in the Choice ofMacroeconomic Policies"
* I would liketo acknowledge the help of the Ioc"np
individuals as referees for this special issue of the Annals: Michael Athans. RayC. Fair. Stanley Fischer. KennethGarhatie. Jack P. Gould, David Kendrjck, Elizabeth Chase MacRae, EdwinS. Mills, Robert S. Pindyck,Alexander H. Sarris, Christopher Sims, Lister Telser, Edison Tse,and Pravin P. Varaiya.
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IA.I.. Norman and James 1.Weatherhy, Jr. (U. Tex.) "OnSelecting
Economic Targets"
Roger H. Gordon (MIT) "TheInvestment Tax Creditas a SLIpplerncntar
Discretionary Stabilization Tool"
S. K. Gupta, Lawrence H. Meyer,Frederick Q. Rains, and 1.J. Tarn
(Washington University) "OptimalCoordination of Aggregate Stabiliza-
tion Policy and Price Control:Some Simulation Results"
Triveni N. Upadhyay and RexJ. Fleming (Texas Instruments),"On the
Computational Aspect of AdaptiveControl in Econometric Modeling"




(iaIriflan; James L. Pierce (FRB)
Jared J. Enzler (FRB) "Overviewof the SMP (SSRC-M IT-Penn)Model and Its Properties"
Arthur M. Havenner, Jared J.Enzler, and Douglas Battenberg (FRB)
"Mini-SMP: Properties and Problemsin Estimation"
Peter A. Tinsley, Roger N.Craine, and Arthur M. Havenner(FRB)
"Control Solutions to the Mini-SMP"
R. S. Pindyck and Steven M.Roberts (MIT and FRB) "OptimalMonetary
PolicySome Further Results"
Benjamin Friedman and E. P.Howrey (Harvard and U. ofMichigan)
"Nonlinear Models and LinearlyOptimal Policies: An Evaluation"
2.00-5.00 Esti,nation and Control
Chairman: David Kendrjck (U.Texas)
Edison Tse (Systems Control)"Identification Problems in Econometric
Models"
Raman Mehra and P. S.Kirshnaprasad (Harvard) "A Unified Approach
to the Structural Estimation ofDistributed Lag Models and Stochastic
Differential Equations"
Gregory C. Chow (Princeton) "ASolution to Optimal Control ofLinear
Systems with Unknown Parameters"
Andrew Abel (Princeton) "AComparison of Three Control Algorithms
as Applied to the Monetarist-Fjscaljst Debate"
Reports of Joint ControlEngineer__Economist Projectson Estimation and ContoI
Kuh, Athans, and Pindyck (MIT)
Kendrick, Tse, Norman, Barshalon(Texas-Systems Control)
7.00 Dinner, Watergate l'errace Restaurant
Speaker: Governor AndrewBrimmer (FRB)
213214
Friday, May 3!
9.00-! 0.30 Dvnwnie Game and 1 i'a,n Problems
Chairman: Michael Athans (MIT)
J. B. Cruz, Jr. (Univ. of Ill.) "Survey of Dynamic Nashand Stackelberg
Strategies"
Y. C. Ho (Harvard) "Information Structures in Many-Person Optiniiza-
tion Problems"
M. Athans (MIT) "Survey of Decentralized Stochastic Control Methods"
IO.45--12.30 Control in Microeconotnics I
Chairman: Gordon C. Rausser )Universitv of Chicago)
(I) Edward A. Stohr (Northwestern U.) "A Model for Project Activities"
Charles S. Tapiero (Columbia U.) "Optimum On-Line Advertising Con-
trol and Goodwill Under Uncertuintv"
James Thurber and Andrew WhinstontPu1!i''Stochastic Control
Problems in Urban Planning"
2.00-5.00 Control in Microeconomus I!
Chairman: Nils H. Hakarisson
(University of California, Berkeley)
(I) George Bitros and Harry Kelejian (NYU) "A Stochastic Control Ap-
proach to Factor Demand"
David C. Cheng and C. Y. Chong (Georgia) "Multistage Pricing Under
Uncertain Demand"
David S. Sibley (Bell Labs.) "Permanent and Transitory Income Effects
in a Model of Optimal Consumption with Wage Uncertainty"
Nils H. Hakansson (U. of California, Berkeley) "Convergence to lsoelastic
Utility and Policy in Multiperiod Portfolio Choice"
I)avid G. Luenberger (Stanford) "An Optimal Control Problem with a
Linear Feedback Solution"
Gordon C. Rausser and Richard Howitt (U. of Chicago arid U. of Cali-
fornia. Davis) "Optimal Stochastic Control of Environmental External-
ities"